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Abstract
It is shown that an aspect of the process of individuation may be thought of as a
fuzzy set. The process of individuation has been interpreted as a two-valued problem
in the history of philosophy. In this work, I intend to show that such a process in
its psychosocial aspect is better understood in terms of a fuzzy set, characterized by
a continuum membership function. According to this perspective, species and their
members present different degrees of individuation. Such degrees are measured from
the membership function of the psychosocial process of individuation. Thus, a social
analysis is suggested by using this approach in human societies.
Keywords: Fuzzy Sets, Species, Process of Individuation, Belonging, Societies
1 Introduction
Fuzzy sets were a revolution in the 20th century. Lotfi Zadeh’s work (Zadeh 1965) has been
applied in several areas in science and technology.1 The main feature of fuzziness is the
ability of characterizing process, systems, and events with the aid of a continuum function,
the membership function. Such a function describes the continuum degree of membership of
the studied system to a specific fuzzy set. That is, within the fuzzy set approach, responses
are not given only in terms of “0” or “1”, “yes” or “no”, and “true” or “false”. There are
degrees of membership. This important feature of the fuzzy sets will be used in order to
describe mathematically the process of individuation, which provides the notion of individual
in philosophy. Then, mathematically, the question about individuation will not be raised
in terms of the dichotomy “non-individual” or “individual” described by an ordinary set
(also called crisp set) or a binary reasoning. I will describe the process of individuation—
at least its psychosocial aspect—in terms of the degree of individuation, i.e., a process of
individuation will be defined as a fuzzy set. It is worth noting that fuzzy sets have been
applied to social sciences and psychology as well. For example, Leung (1980) described
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1An introduction to fuzzy sets and its applications is found in Zimmermann (1996, 2010).
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the degree of liking between individuals by using a continuum membership function, and
Smithson (1982) studied fuzziness in behavioral sciences.
According to several philosophers, individuation has been thought of as a binary variable
in the history of philosophy. For those who thought of individuation as a process, like the
French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1992), individuation, or an individual, is considered
as result of a process, and non-individuation is the lack of such a process. However, as
indicated by Simondon in the 20th century, among individuals, especially living beings, it
is not hard to see differences of degrees of individuation. In living beings, I suggest that
degrees of individuation are given by a fuzzy set. Then, the process of individuation and,
as we will see, even the sense of belonging to a species or a larger group and structure
may be thought of in terms of fuzzy sets in a psychosocial perspective. This perspective of
the process of individuation—the psychosocial one—will be focused on this article. I will
describe it mathematically by means of the membership function of fuzzy sets. Thus, the
process of individuation and the sense of belonging will not be described by means of a
binary variable.
For important scholars in the history of philosophy (Audi 1999), individuation is suppos-
edly generated by the principle of individuation. But, following Simondon and rejecting a
metaphysical principle, one may indicate individuation as a process and describe it physically
and mathematically in terms of physical quantities and by using a continuum membership
function. The psychosocial aspect of the individuated being will be conceived of as fuzzy sets
endowed with continuum membership functions that provide the grade of individuation and
the grade of belonging of a specific individual to a larger structure. By using this approach
in order to describe the process of individuation in its psychosocial aspect, it is shown that
the process of individuation, as a non-binary process, can be applied to characterize human
societies.
The structure of this article is as follows: Sec. 2 presents the definitions of both the
principle of individuation and process of individuation, focusing on the psychosocial aspect;
in Sec. 3 the fuzzy process of individuation is defined with a suggested application in human
societies in Sec. 4. The final remarks are presented in Sec. 5.
2 The process of individuation
In philosophy, the principle of individuation (principium individuationis) has been a very
useful concept. According to dictionaries of philosophy, the principle of individuation is
“what makes something individual as opposed to universal” (Audi, 1999, p. 737). In this
sense, a specific man is different from the concept, or universal man, because of the principle
of individuation. Therefore, in this perspective, our world is described as multiplicity of
entities because the principle of individuation is acting.
In Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy, for example, the principle of individuation pro-
motes the world as representation. As the being-in-itself or the thing-in-itself is the will
(beyond the principle of individuation, that in his philosophy is equivalent to space and
time2), Schopenhauer says that the principle of individuation generates individuals from the
2“I shall call time and space the principium individuationis, an expression borrowed from the old scholas-
ticism (...)”, (Schopenhauer, 1969, Second Book, §23).
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will (unity), which is the origin of the world, “the innermost essence, the kernel, of every
particular thing and also of the whole.”3 Therefore, unity, or the thing-in-itself, presents
itself as a myriad of objects, i.e., the world, our sensible or physical world, is the will by
means of the principle of individuation.
On the other hand, for Friedrich Nietzsche, at least in the very first period of his work,
the principle of individuation is identified to a drive (Trieb), which received the name of
the Greek God Apollo. But the origin of the world, such as in Schopenhauer’s work, is
attributed to unity, which in Nietzsche’s initial philosophy received the name of primordial
unity (Ur-Eine).4 Above all, the principle of individuation for Nietzsche and Schopenhauer
was the attempt of describing the multiplicity in terms of a unique origin or a unique cause.
Individuation and its supposed cause, the principle of individuation, were ingredients to
justify the sensible world from a single metaphysical origin.
In this work, by ignoring metaphysical speculations of a supposed principle of individu-
ation, I conceive of individuation among and within species as a natural process. It is not
hard to see that individuation is promoted in different degrees, according to species. Each
member, or individual, recognizes in some degree the difference between the “self” and the
world, the “self” and other objects and members of species or community. There exists an
enormous difference in the process of individuation if one considers different species. For
example, individuation is more stressed in men than in ants. Even in human societies, the
process of individuation presents different degrees. The sense of participation or the sense
of belonging to a larger entity may decrease the degree of individuation in some cases. Ac-
cording to Nietzsche, for example, there were elements in the Greek tragedy that ensured
the belief in some kind of participation in something higher, there was a “sense of belonging
to a higher community.”5 Members of the audience recognized a union between people and
nature. This return to nature was promoted by another drive in Nietzschean philosophy—
the Greek God Dionysus. That is, individuals, or citizens, during the Greek tragedy had
their degrees of individuation decreased.
Both the process of individuation and the sense of belonging are interpreted as natural
drives in this article.6 I will focus on the psychosocial feature of the process of individuation
(and, consequently, on the sense of belonging). And we will find the notion of psychosocial
process of individuation in Simondon’s work.
In the 20th century, considering the importance of looking at degrees of individuation
as well,7 Simondon (Simondon 1992, 2009) wrote about the process of individuation, or
ontogenesis, as something better understood in terms of a non-classical logic, instead of
the binary one: “one sees that classical logic can not be used to understand individuation
3Schopenhauer (1969, Second book, §21).
4Nietzsche (2007, I). The mature Nietzsche rejected the primordial unity because his philosophy of wills
to power is plural.
5Ibidem.
6Without Schopenhauer’s influence, the mature Nietzsche constructed his own work. In that period, the
Apolline and Dionysian drives are not abandoned. From that period, they carry a totally natural sense:
they are manifestations of wills to power.
7“I intend therefore to study the forms, modes and degrees of individuation in order to situate accurately
the individual in the wider being according to the three levels of the physical, the vital and the psychosocial,”
Simondon (1992, p. 311). As we can see, there are degrees, which will be interpreted as continuum in the
fuzzy approach, and three levels of individuation as well, which will be discussed hereafter.
3
(...)”.8 Simondon presented in his philosophy of individuation an influential interpretation
of the process of individuation. For him, the process of individuation is better described
by not only a non-classical logic, but using modern physical concepts as well, like energy
and (meta)-stability. According to Simondon, modern physics offers adequate tools in order
to interpret individuals as process, which are systems with nonvanishing potential energies.
In particular, an individual is the process of individuation acting, is not a fixed result of
a process. For living beings (and Simondon’s perspective describes all individuals, living
beings or not), the process of individuation is something that occurs between the individual
and the environment (milieu):9
The process of individuation must be considered primordial, for it is this process that
at once brings the individual into being and determines all the distinguishing char-
acteristics of its development, organization and modalities. Thus, the individual is
to be understood as having a relative reality, occupying only a certain phase of the
whole being in question – a phase that therefore carries the implication of a preced-
ing preindividual state, and that, even after individuation, does not exist in isolation,
since individuation does not exhaust in the single act of its appearance all the poten-
tials embedded in the preindividual state. Individuation, moreover, not only brings the
individual to light but also the individual-milieu dyad.
The individuated being, or individual, according to Simondon, is a metastable state—a
dynamical process that solves problems, acts, and simultaneously individuates itself. The
individual is a state that appears from a preindividual state. From this perspective, the ter-
minology used by Simondon—the concepts of process and state—is very adequate. Because
the individuated being is not a static being, a final state, something eternal and firm. In
my reading, Simondon and his philosophy of individuation bring concepts and similar inter-
pretations to Heraclitus and Nietzsche. Such as Heraclitus, one can see the importance of
becoming, or process. Such as Nietzsche, one can find the question about “stability” of indi-
viduals. For Nietzsche, individuated beings are transitory configurations of wills to power.10
In particular, man is not an aeterna veritas (eternal truth):11
All philosophers have the common failing of starting out from man as he is now and
thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of him. They involuntarily think
of “man” as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant in the midst of all
flux, as a sure measure of things.
Simondon considered levels of individuation as well. The process of individuation is ori-
gin of both physical objects and living beings. For living beings, specifically, individuation
is more sophisticated: “The living being resolves its problems not only by adapting itself
which is to say, by modifying its relationship to its milieu (something a machine is equally
able to do) – but by modifying itself through the invention of new internal structures (...)”.12
For Simondon, living beings participate of the process of individuation in three levels: phys-
ical, vital and psychosocial level. The physical one is considered because living beings are
8Idem, p. 312. A possible non-classical logic is the fuzzy logic, which comes from the fuzzy sets.
9Idem, p. 300.
10See Müller-Lauter (1993).
11Nietzsche (2005, p. 12).
12Simondon (1992, p. 305).
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“made up” of particles (or quantum fields), according to the standard model of particles.
The vital level represents the biological individuation. And the last one—the psychosocial
individuation—is the union of both the psychological and social individuation. In Simondon
philosophy, there is no strict separation between social and psychological processes. In this
sense, the fuzzy process of individuation proposed in the next section captures the degree of
psychological and social individuation. The fuzzy approach also provides the increased sense
of belonging indicated by Nietzsche in the Greek tragedy. Accordingly, belonging and indi-
viduation (or individuality) can be described as fuzzy sets, providing the notions of degree
of belonging and degree of individuality.
Following Simondon and a natural approach for the process of individuation to the detri-
ment of the metaphysical one, Weinbaum and Veitas (2017) proposed recently a new form to
define and conceive intelligence by means of the process of individuation. According to the
authors, intelligent agents emerge from a complex context and become intelligent from a pro-
cess of self-organization and formation, where “individuation is a resolution of a problematic
situation” (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2017, p. 10). As we can see, the process of individuation
is totally naturalized for those authors as well.
In the next section, I will indicate a different approach to the process of individuation.
Rather than a binary process, where 0 means non-individual, and 1 means a full individual,
I will adopt a fuzzy perspective.13 Then, the process of individuation in its psychosocial
aspect will be thought of as a fuzzy set, characterized by a membership function, which
assumes a continuum interval of values between 0 and 1.
3 Describing a fuzzy process of individuation
To think about a fuzzy process of individuation means to realize various degrees of individ-
uation among and within species. The process of individuation in its psychosocial aspect
may be thought of as a subset P of X (P ⊆ X), where X is the set of all individuals. Each
individual of X, a member of a species, group or society, is indicated by x. One assumes
that P is a fuzzy set characterized by a membership function fP (x). Then the membership
function for each individual in X is described by a continuum interval [0, 1]. For each in-
dividual, the membership function measures the degree of psychosocial individuation: the
minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 1. Therefore, the fuzzy psychosocial process of
individuation P is defined as set of ordered pairs (x, fP (x)) such that
P = {(x, fP (x)) : x ∈ X, fP (x) : X → [0, 1]}. (1)
If I had used an ordinary (or crisp) set in order to describe P , the membership function would
assume only 0 or 1 (fP (x) : X → {0, 1}). That is, in ordinary sets theory, an individual x
would be or would not be included in P . But from the definition of the psychosocial process
of individuation, given by Eq. (1), there will be degrees of membership in P , not only two
possible answers.
13It is worth mentioning that for Schopenhauer there were degrees of manifestation of the will. Men are
higher degrees of manifestation, or higher degrees of objectivity, than ants. Then, in my interpretation, one
can see indications for a fuzzy approach in Schopenhauer philosophy as well (see Schopenhauer 1969, Second
book, §21 and §24). A process of individuation with degrees of individuation was indicated in Neves (2019)
(and as we saw in Simondon (1992)), but without a formulation in terms of fuzzy sets.
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The extreme values 0 and 1 for the fuzzy process of individuation have interesting mean-
ings. The value 0means absence of individuality, and if the membership function is fP (x) = 0
for all x′s, we will have the empty set ∅ of the psychosocial process of individuation:
∅ = {(x, fP (x) = 0), ∀x ∈ X}. (2)
Therefore, there is no social individual, and the psychosocial process of individuation is
not acting. On the other hand, the value 1 for the membership function stands for a full or
complete individual—the extremal case of the psychosocial individuation. If the membership
function is fP (x) = 1 for all x
′s, we will have the universal fuzzy set U of the psychosocial
process of individuation written as
U = {(x, fP (x) = 1), ∀x ∈ X}. (3)
The extreme fuzzy sets ∅ and U have the following relation with the fuzzy set P :
∅ ≤ P ≤ U. (4)
Thus, the maximum and minimum values of fP (x) mean: the closer to 0, the smaller the
psychosocial process of individuation, and the closer to 1, the greater the psychosocial process
of individuation. As I said, the sense of belonging is also interpreted within this approach.
Belonging B can be conceived of as a fuzzy set, and given an individual x, he/she will have
a degree of membership in B, which is defined as set of ordered pairs (x, fB(x)), i.e.,
B = {(x, fB(x)) : x ∈ X, fB(x) : X → [0, 1]}. (5)
An individual presents degrees of membership in P and B at the same time, has a certain
degree of individuation and a certain degree of belonging to a group. In general, P and B
will not be conceived of as correlated sets a priori. That is, high degree of individuation
does not necessarily mean low degree of belonging and vice versa. However, in some cases,
for example based on Nietzsche’s interpretation of Greek tragedy, the concepts of individu-
ation and belonging may be negatively correlated to each other. As Nietzsche pointed out,
Greek tragedy increased the sense of belonging and decreased the sense of individuality or
individuation of the audience. But, as I said, this is not the general case, then the process
of individuation and the sense of belonging are not necessarily assumed to be negatively
correlated or complements of each other.
Among and within species, the value of fP (x) is not constant. That is, within a fixed
species S, the membership function assumes
min
x∈S
fP (x) < fP (x) < max
x∈S
fP (x). (6)
Then, there are individuals with a larger degree of individuation than others. Even for a spe-
cific individual, fP (x) is not constant along his/her entire life. Comparing different species,
the difference in the process of individuation is even more notable. For example, I suggest
that the values min fP (x) and max fP (x) in humans are larger than in ants. Therefore, when
we compare species, groups or societies, it is more appropriate to assume fP (x) as a random
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variable and obtain the usual mean value of the process of individuation, f¯P (S), for each
species, group or society:
f¯P (S) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
fP (xi), (7)
where N stands for the number of individuals of a specific society, group, and species
(x1, x2, ..., xN). That is, for humans (H) and ants (A), for example, one has the follow-
ing relation for the mean value of the process of individuation:
f¯P (H) > f¯P (A), (8)
which reflects the uniformity of the social life for a large number of individuals in a society
of ants.
As pointed out earlier, there are intervals of individuation for each species or group. Then,
the values of fP (x), or the values of individuation, may assume different intervals according
to specific human societies. Besides, one can assume that the human interval, due to the
cultural variations, is larger than the corresponding interval for any species. Comparing
both the human and ant species once again, one has
∆fP (H) > ∆fP (A), (9)
where ∆fP (x) stands for max fP (x)−min fP (x).
4 A suggested social analysis
Following Nietzsche, who characterized societies from human types,14 I suggest a statistical
application of the fuzzy process of individuation in order to describe societies, focusing on
human societies. From the above discussion, I propose that the psychosocial process of
individuation, for example, is more stressed in capitalist societies than in socialist ones, i.e.,
the mean value of fP (x) among citizens is larger in the capitalist system than in the socialist
system. Moreover, the sense of belonging to a higher structure—the modern state—is more
emphasized by the people in socialist societies.
A low mean value for fP (x) indicates low degrees of individuation among citizens. For
Nietzsche, controversially, socialism “aspires to the annihilation of the individual”15 because
the socialist state is more dominant in the social life. That is, socialism “desires an abun-
dance of state power”.16 In another text, the German philosopher relates both the state
development and the individual: “The state is a prudent institution for the protection of
individuals against one another: if it is completed and perfected too far it will in the end
14In Nietzsche (2003, p. 84, fragment 2 (127) of 1885), for example, it is found “the nihilist consequences
of the political and economic way of thinking”. For the German philosopher, nihilistic individuals generate
nihilistic societies and vice versa. Using Simondon’s framework, both systems, individual and society, are
not stable, they interact with themselves. For Simondon, there are processes of individuation for societies as
well: “Individuation in its collective aspect makes a group individual (...)” (Simondon 1992, p. 307). Both
processes, individual and social, are dynamical, generating mutual influences.
15Nietzsche (2005, p. 173).
16Ibidem.
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enfeeble the individual and, indeed, dissolve him (...)”.17 The strong presence of the socialist
state imposes a lower degree of individuation in socialist societies.
On the other hand, in capitalist societies, the belief in values such as the free initiative
promotes high degrees of individuation, or high mean values for fP (x). In moral sense, this
may be translated into individualism, which is more evident in capitalist societies. However,
there is sense of belonging in capitalist societies as well, but in certain cases it is an atomized
sense. The sense of belonging to parties, religions, groups, and teams increases the degree of
belonging in capitalist societies. But parties, religions, groups, and teams are not stronger
than the modern state in order to promote the sense of belonging. In modernity, state is the
strongest way to join or unify people. Nietzsche in Thus spoke Zarathustra wrote about the
“new idol”, the modern state:18
Somewhere still there are peoples and herds, but not where we live, my brothers: here
there are states.
State? What is that? Well then, lend me your ears now, for I shall say my words about
the death of peoples.
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. It even lies coldly, and this lie
crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.”
Therefore, according to my interpretation, the modern state generates the highest sense
of belonging today. And, following Nietzsche, for societies where state is strong, like the
socialist state, the mean value for the process of individuation is low because the modern
state “aspires to the annihilation of the individual.” It is worth noting that the modern
notions of patriotism and nationalism were created in order to increase the sense of belonging
even in capitalist societies.19 But in socialist societies the economic system is another key
ingredient that amplifies the sense of belonging. In the end, that is the reason why the
average degree of individuation is lower in socialist countries and the sense of belonging is
stronger than in capitalist countries.20
In human societies, high mean values for the process of individuation (f¯P (H)→ 1) means
“isolated”21 individuals who do not believe in a cohesive or collective society. Exaggerated
individualistic behaviors may lead to situations where “all against all” is the rule. In general,
it is worth noting that high mean values of fP (x) are not problem in itself. We must consider
the associated variance σ2P of the mean psychosocial process of individuation as well. The
variance σ2
P
gives the level of dispersion of the process, offers a measure of “uniformity” of a
specific society or group. The variance is given by
σ2
P
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
fP (xi)− f¯P (S)
)
2
. (10)
17Idem, p. 113.
18Nietzsche (2006, p. 34). Today it is not sufficient to belong to a specific culture, the demand is for
states. Terrorists and peoples, such as Catalans, aim to found states.
19See Primoratz (2019) for a review on the notions of patriotism and their differences in relation to the
notion of nationalism.
20According to Canovan (2000), the notion of patriotism may not be sufficient to join people in capitalist
societies, thus questions about identity and values are also important for the sense of belonging.
21The quotes indicate that a completely isolated individual does not exist. The individual has cultural
and collective origins as well.
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In a hypothetical “divine society,” for example, we have the maximum mean value for the
process of individuation. For such a fictional society, whose members are gods, fP (x) assumes
1 for all individuals. Thus, P plays the role of the universal fuzzy set U . Moreover, the
variance of the process for this divine society is low, indeed it is zero.22 Above all, the
variance of the mean value for the process of individuation is a critical problem in real
human societies. Such as in the social classes analysis, the problem may be large values for
the variance σ2
P
, which is translated into large differences among social classes or high levels
of hierarchy.
It is worth emphasizing that the classification presented here is continuum. Between
indicated types in Table 1, which are limits, there are degrees of both individuation and
hierarchy. That is the reason why the classification of states, social systems, and societies
is not always a two-valued problem, a binary choice between “yes” or “no”. China represents
such a difficulty today. The difficulty regarding the question whether China is capitalist, or
socialist, or communist, or something else, appears due to fuzziness. China possesses degrees
of membership in the capitalism and socialism systems. In this example and others, there is
no response in terms of an exclusive “left” or “right”. Then, fuzzy sets are appropriate tools
in order to ban dichotomous points of view in social and political sciences.
4.1 Low mean values for the process of individuation
Assuming fP (x) a random variable, we can evaluate its associated variance σ
2
P . Then,
societies with low mean values of individuation f¯P (H) are characterized by different values
for σ2
P
. For low values of σ2
P
, one has horizontal societies, where the utopian communism is
its limit when σ2P → 0. On the other hand, a large value of σ
2
P leads to a vertical society,
where socialist dictatorships and real monarchies are examples. As pointed out earlier,
f¯P (H) is low for socialist societies (compared to capitalist ones). With high values of σ
2
P
for this corresponding case, the social organization contains well-defined hierarchies, leading
to vertical societies. But, on the other hand, the utopian communism rejects classes and a
hierarchical society. That is the reason why σ2P tends to zero for such an ideal society.
4.2 High mean values for the process of individuation
Large values for f¯P (H) indicate other scenarios. For high σ
2
P
for the corresponding choice
of f¯P (H), one has vertical societies with supposedly “isolated” agents. Western capitalist
societies are examples for those values of σ2
P
. In this case, even with the patriotic feeling,
the sense of belonging to a larger structure is not too emphasized (compared to socialist
societies), that is to say, members of this type of social organization give value to individ-
uality to the detriment of collectivity. Such societies present still well-defined hierarchical
institutions and differences among classes. The limit of this case is interpreted as a non-
society, i.e., extreme individuality alongside high values for σ2
P
leads to hordes of Hobbesian
“natural men,” where there is no sense of belonging, and each individual disputes against
each individual. In this case, hierarchies are constructed by differences in power, or by using
a Nietzschean concept, by differences among wills to power.
22The Greek Olympus would be a good example for this type of society, but the Mount Olympus has a
king, Zeus, then it has hierarchy.
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Mean Value of Individuation fP (x) Variance: σ
2
P
σ2Phigh → “all against all” (non-society)
f¯Phigh(H)
σ2Plow → divine society
σ2Phigh → vertical society (hierarchy)
f¯Plow(H)
σ2
Plow
→ horizontal society (non-hierarchy)
Table 1: Types of human (H) societies according to the values of the psychosocial process of
individuation and their corresponding variances. The table illustrates possible configurations
and their limits. There are degrees between the illustrated limits.
The last limit to be studied is the case where f¯P (H) is high and σ
2
P is low. In this curious
case, the limit of σ2
P
for such a society promotes an organization of gods, i.e., each member
is view as a complete individual (a fictitious individual), and there is lack of both classes and
well-defined hierarchical organizations (see Table 1 for an overview of types of societies).
5 Final remarks
Fuzzy sets are one of the most revolutionary concepts in science and technology. In this
paper, I adopted this idea to look at the problem of individuation. Considered as a two-
valued problem, the process of individuation has been thought of as a process that offers only
two answers: non-individual and individual. Rather than a process described by an ordinary
set, I proposed a process of individuation described by a fuzzy set. Then, its corresponding
membership function assumes a continuum interval [0, 1] as image. With this interpretation,
the process of individuation in its psychosocial aspect presents degrees of individuation: the
closer to 0, the smaller the degree of individuation, and the closer to 1, the greater the degree
of individuation. Each species has their specific values of individuation. Due to the possible
different values of variance for the individuation in human societies, the psychosocial process
of individuation may indicate both degrees of cohesion and hierarchy. For high values of
variance, for example, the psychosocial process of individuation describes both dictatorial
societies and hierarchical societies. For low values of variance, one has horizontal societies
without (or almost without) both hierarchical structures and classes.
The psychosocial process of individuation proposed in this article may offer new variables
in order to describe human societies and social groups, with fuzzy sets indicating degrees of
both individuation and belonging.
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